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Resum: En aquest treball es presenta un model eclèctic que sistematitza la dinàmica de les 
crisis que “s’autoconfimen”, usant els principals aspectes de les tres tipologies dels models 
de crisis canviàries de “tercera generació”, amb la finalitat de descriure els fets que 
precipiten la renúncia al manteniment d’una paritat fixada. Les contribucions més notables 
són les implicacions per a la  política econòmica, així com la pèrdua del paper del tipus de 
canvi com instrument d’ajust macroeconòmic, quan els “efectes de balanç”  són una  
possibilitat real. 
Paraules clau: crisis financeres i de tipus de canvi, atac especulatiu, pànic financer, 
liberalització financera 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The worldwide financial integration characteristic of 1990s has contributed strikingly to 
increase the frequency and the intensity of exchange rate crises in emerging countries. As a 
result, over the last fifteen years, it has been flourishing studies, both theoretical and 
empirical, about the nature and causes of the withdrawal of pegged exchange rate systems. 
Despite we could identify large common features in these different crises episodes, today 
there isn’t yet a canonical model of financial and exchange rate crises in economic literature. 
In fact, when Eichengreen, Rose and Wyploz (1995) introduced the terminologies of first and 
second generation crisis models, they were pointing up that every new wave of crises was 
giving rise to a new typology of interpretative schemes. 
Thus first generation models were the explanation of exchange rate crises at the beginning of 
1970s, whereas inspiration to second generation models arose from the string of speculative 
attacks that the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of European Monetary System (EMS) 
suffered between 1992 and 1993 as well as the Mexican crisis in 1994. Again, the 
proliferation of third generation models was the result of efforts to analyze the East Asian 
crisis in 1997. 
This lack of consensus about the nature of modern exchange rate crises makes it difficult to 
identify the factors that have caused them. In this way, Krugman (2000) wrote “if we can’t 
agree about what happened, how we can blame increasing foreign trade or another factor of 
the collapse of exchange rate system?” 
Nevertheless, since the burst of the 1997 East Asian crisis, there was a definitive tendency in 
economic literature to move away from models that emphasized moral hazard problems in 
benefit of some self-fulfilling panic. At the same time, this self-fulfilling panic was 
increasingly related to maturity mismatches and/ or currency mismatches. 
For this reason, it would appear to be a good moment, today, ten years after the East Asian 
crisis, to present an eclectic model that synthesizes the different versions of the third 
generation exchange rate crises models, and describes stylized facts that hasten the 
withdrawal of a pegged exchange rate system. 
The paper is divided into four parts and one appendix. In the first one, the different variants of 
third generation exchange rate crises models are presented. In the second section, we create 
an eclectic model that systematizes the dynamics of self-fulfilling crises, focusing the main 
aspects of the three typologies of third generation models. The third part describes, drawing 
on the model built previously, the stylized facts that hastened the financial crisis and pegged 
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exchange rate system withdrawal. The final section summarizes the main results find out 
while annex offers some empirical evidences that reinforces all our arguments.  
 
1. THE LOGIC OF THIRD GENERATION MODELS 
 
After the burst of the Eastern Asian financial and exchange rate crisis in the summer of 1997, 
many analysts pointed out that the concepts and models prevailing at that moment didn’t fit 
with the dynamic of crisis and misinterpreted data1. An then, likewise the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism crisis of EMS in 1992 and later the Mexican Crisis at the end of 1994 raised 
doubts about classic models, the Asian crisis questioned explanatory power of second 
generation models and speed up the appearance of new interpretative schemes, which by 
taking aspects of traditional models, provided relevant factors to analyze a new typology of 
exchange rate crisis. So these new models became, in their early stages, a synthesis approach 
that tried to mix the main characteristics of the first and second generation models to explain 
the causes of the 1997 East Asian crisis. However, the evolution of this new wave of models 
ended up shaping a third generation with their own identity. 
The third generation crisis models revolve around three basic variants. A first version of these 
models implies a string of investments affected by moral hazard that leads to an excessive 
growth of foreign debt and afterwards to the collapse of financial and exchange rate system. 
This story has its origin in McKinnon and Pill’s (1996) article, taken up later by Krugman 
(1998) and developed in-depth by Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999). A second version, 
complementary to the previous one and linked above all to Chang and Velasco (1998a and 
1998b), is created around Diamond and Dybvig’s (1983) bankruptcy model applied to an 
open economy. Finally, the third version analyzes how financial difficulties, which are 
associated to national currency devaluation, undermine domestic companies’ solvency and 
macroeconomic fundamentals. This last argument is claimed to Krugman (1999b and 1999d) 
as well as Schneider and Tornell (2000). 
 
                                                          
1 See Corsetti (1998), Corsetti, Penseti and Roubini (1998), Calvo (1998), Calvo and Végh (1998), Cavallari and Corsetti (1996) and Flood 
and Marion (1998).
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2. AN ECLECTIC THIRD GENERATION MODEL 
At this point, we introduce an eclectic model that systematizes the dynamics of self-fulfilling 
crises, from the consideration of main aspects of the three variants of third generation models. 
Our analysis implies three basic equations and two functions that allow us to describe the 
gestations and bursting of a financial and exchange rate crisis as well as the significance of 
the balance sheet problems and their devastating effects. 
 
2.1. THE SPECIFICATION OF THE MODEL 
2.1.1. GOODS AND SERVICES MARKETS: THE REAL ECONOMY (RE) CURVE 
 
The first equation of the model reproduces the working of goods and services markets. As we 
know national output (Y) equals to aggregate demand (AD) in equilibrium. 
 
(1)  MXGICADY −+++=≡
We can breakdown the former equation using the components of aggregate demand (AD) that 
is the sum of Consumption (C), Investment (I), Government Spending (G), and Exports (X) 
minus Imports (M). Let’s now discuss each of these five components in turn. 
Private Consumption depends on disposable income (YD) and on domestic interest rates. 
Then we write Private Consumption function as follows: 
0;0 <∂
∂>∂
∂
r
C
YD
C(1a)  ,     rcYDcCC ⋅−⋅+= 21
As we can see the relation between Private Consumption, disposable income and domestic 
interest rates is characterized by two parameters: c1 and c2. The parameter c1 is the propensity 
to consume whereas c2 is the sensitivity of consumption to changing interest rates. It seems 
logical to think a natural restriction on c  is that it will be positive and on c1 2 is that it will be 
negative. Thus, consumption demand is positively related to disposable income and 
negatively related to national interest rates. On the other hand, C represents autonomous 
consumption, which is economy’s minimal consumption, essential to cover basic 
consumption needs.    
( ) rcTRtYYcCC 21 ⋅−+−⋅+= 000 <∂∂<∂∂>∂∂ rC;tC;YC(1a.1) ,  
We suppose disposable income is given by YD = Y – T + TR, where Y is domestic income, T 
is income taxes paid taxpayers and TR is Government transfers received by consumers. In 
addition, we assume T = t·Y, that is taxes are a proportional tax on income. Higher taxes 
decrease consumption, also less than one for one. We will also take transfers  as an TRTR =
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exogenous variable. Then, equation 1a.1 tells us that consumption is a function of income, 
taxes and domestic interest rates.   
 
Private Investment is a function of domestic interest rates (r) and companies’ self-finance 
capacity (SFC). I  is the autonomous investment and symbolizes economy’s minimal 
investment. 
0;0 <∂
∂>∂
∂
r
I
SFC
IrbSFCbII ⋅−⋅+= 21(1b) ,   
The relation of Private Investment with national interest rates and companies’ self-finance 
capacity (SFC) depends on two coefficients: b1 and b . The b2 1 coefficient is the propensity to 
investment related to SFC. Its value will be positive because the higher companies’ self-
finance capacity (SFC) the higher companies’ investment. The coefficient b2 is the sensitivity 
of investment to changing interest rates and its value is negative. This parameter collects 
companies’ expectations. 
Here, we suppose that companies’ self-finance capacity depends on equity value, the 
difference between assets (A) and debt value. Debt value is the sum of domestic debt (D) and 
foreign debt in local currency (E·D*). As we are thinking in terms of emerging countries, we 
consider there is an ”original sin” problem2 so national companies can borrow abroad but 
they only invest in national assets.  
 
Consequently, equation 1b can be written as 1b.1: 
0;0 <∂
∂<∂
∂
E
I
r
I( )[ ] rbDEDAbII ⋅−⋅+−⋅+= 2*1(1b.1) ,   
[ ] ( )*DEDADebtAssetsEquitySFC ⋅+−=−==where  
Thus, any nominal exchange rate depreciation drives up foreign debt value in national 
currency, and it defines a negative causality between private investment and nominal 
exchange rate movements. 
 
                                                          
2 Original sin shows how the existence of incomplete capital markets makes it difficult for the emerging economies’ ability to issue debt in 
international bond markets, an extreme that forces them to get into foreign currency debt in order to capture external saving and this puts the 
national economy at currency risk. 
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The third component of demand in our model is Government spending. We will take G as an 
exogenous variable because, thought Government behaviour is predictable, we will suppose 
there isn’t a reliable rule we can write for it. 
GG =(1c)  
Exports are the part of foreign demand that falls on domestic demand. They depend on 
foreign income in nominal terms (p*·Y*) positively because, ceteris paribus, higher foreign 
income means higher foreign demand for all goods and services. So, higher foreign income 
leads to higher exports. In the same way, exports also depend on nominal exchange rate (E). 
The higher the nominal exchange rates, the higher foreign demand for domestic goods, and, 
the higher exports. Finally, the x X parameter gauges economy’s trade openness. 1 represents 
autonomous exports. 
0;0* >∂
∂>∂
∂
E
X
Y
X(1d)  ,    **1 YpExXX ⋅⋅+=
Imports are the part of domestic demand that falls on foreign goods and services. They 
depend on domestic income in nominal terms (p·Y) negatively because, ceteris paribus, 
higher domestic income means higher domestic demand for all goods and services, both 
domestic and foreign. So, higher domestic income leads to higher imports. Thus, the 
propensity to import illustrated by the m M1 parameter is negative. represents autonomous 
imports. Finally, even though imports also depend on nominal exchange rate (E) negatively3, 
we don’t consider it explicitly because we show imports in terms of domestic currency.   
 
01 >=∂
∂ m
Y
M,    (1d) YpmMM ⋅⋅+= 1
Putting all these components together, we can construct the RE curve illustrated in figure 1. It 
plots the functioning of a country’s real economy.  
The RE curve is really a function formed by all combinations of nominal exchange rates (E) 
and domestic output (Y) for which markets of goods and services are in short-term 
equilibrium. It means aggregate output equals to aggregate demand, as expression 1e shows. 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]*1**1122 )( DEbYpExDAbrbcSY ⋅⋅−⋅⋅⋅+−⋅+⋅+−α=(1e) RE Function →  
1111
1
mtcc +⋅+−=α   is the autonomous spending multiplier  where 
[ ]MXGTRcICS 1 −++⋅++=  is the autonomous spending   and  
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Figure 1. Goods and services markets operation: Real Economy (RE) curve 
 
Source: Author’s own diagram based on Krugman (2000) 
 
Assuming fixed price levels at home and abroad in the short-term and no foreign debt (D*=0), 
the previous RE function can be written as: 
(1e.1)  RE1 Function → ( ) ( )[ ]**1122 YpExDAbr)bc(SY ⋅⋅⋅+−⋅+⋅+−α=  
 
Here, a rise in nominal exchange rate makes foreign goods and services more expensive 
relative to domestic goods and services. So, this relative price change caused by nominal 
depreciation increases domestic goods competitiveness, fostering higher exports. A larger 
foreign demand explains the rising in aggregate demand that stimulates domestic output 
growth. 
From these arguments we can deduce a positive relation between nominal exchange rate and 
national income that we will call pro-competitive effect and which is gathered through 
( )**1 YpEx ⋅⋅  in expression (1e). 
Pro-competitive effect:  0**1 >⋅=∂
∂ Ypx
E
Y  
For the moment, this pro-competitive effect explains the positive slope of RE1 curve in figure 
1. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
3 The higher the nominal exchange rates the lower domestic demand for foreign goods, so they are more expensive and imports will go down 
E 
Nominal 
Echange Rate 
RE1
Y 
National Income 
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2.1.2. MONEY MARKET AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET: THE 
FINANCIAL ECONOMY (FE) CURVE 
 
The second of equations that forms this eclectic model that we are building, represents 
national money market equilibrium. 
P
M
P
M Sd =(2)  
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
P
M DThe real money demand is the total demand for money in real terms for all households 
and companies in the economy. We write money demand in real terms as a function of 
nominal interest rates (r) and domestic income (Y).  
 
0;0 <∂
∂>∂
∂
r
M
Y
M dd( ) rlYlrYL
P
M d ⋅−== 21,(2a) ,   
As we can see the relation between real money demand, domestic income and national 
interest rates is characterized by two parameters: l  and l1 2. The parameter l1 is the sensitivity 
of demand for money to changing domestic income and collects money demand for 
transaction and precaution reasons. l1 has a positive value because demand for money will 
increase in proportion to nominal income. 
On the other hand, the parameter l2 is the sensitivity of money demand to changing interest 
rates and shows the function of money as store of value. It seems logical to think a natural 
restriction on l2 is that it will be negative because the higher interest rate the higher the 
opportunity cost of money holdings. 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
P
M SThe money supply  in real terms gauges purchasing power of the amount of money 
(MS) in economy. We suppose money supply in real terms depends on monetary base (H) and 
money multiplier (mm).  
Hmm
P
M S ⋅= 0;0 >∂
∂>∂
∂
H
M
mm
M SS(2b) ,    
Let H monetary base that is the supply of central bank money. We assume H is directly 
controlled by central bank as well as it can change the amount of H through open market 
operations. So, the higher monetary base, the higher money supply. 
At the same time, the effectiveness of open market operations depends on money multiplier 
mm. It implies that a given change in monetary base (H) has a larger effect on the money 
supply in real terms. 
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Obviously, given price level (P), equilibrium in financial markets requires that real money 
demand ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
P
M D
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
P
M S be equal to money supply in real terms . 
( )
P
MHmmrlYl
P
M Sd =⋅=⋅−⋅= 21(2b)  
And rewriting this previous equation 2b, we find the equilibrium domestic interest rate: 
  
( ) Y
l
l
Hmm
l
r ⋅+⋅⋅−=
2
1
2
1 0;0 <∂
∂>∂
∂
H
r
Y
r(2c) ,      
4Related to this, we suppose that the fear of floating  moves central bank to compensate any 
change of nominal exchange rate. In order to collect this subordination of monetary policy to 
the maintenance of certain parity, we introduce the third of the model equations: interest rate 
parity condition in presence of imperfectly substitute financial assets. Interest parity condition 
states that foreign exchange rate market is in equilibrium only when expected rates of return 
on domestic and foreign currency deposits plus a premium risk (ρ) –which reflects the spread 
between national and foreign bonds risk– are equal. 
(3a)  ρ++= drr *
In this way domestic interest rates (r) gauge expected rate of return on financial investment in 
domestic currency deposits (RFIDC). Likewise, the sum of foreign interest rates (r*) plus 
depreciation rate (d) is expected rate of return on financial investment in foreign currency 
deposits (RFIFC). 
For a given expected future exchange rate (EE) and premium risk (ρ), the interest rate parity 
condition describing foreign exchange market equilibrium –in presence of imperfectly 
substitute financial assets– is the equation 3a: 
ρ+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+=
E
EErr
E
*
E
EEd
E −= 0;0 * >∂
∂<∂
∂
r
E
r
E(3b) ,     where   and      
We found the equilibrium domestic interest rate in equation 2c. Now, we replace it in 
equation 3b to get 3c.  
( ) rY
l
l
Hmm
lE
EErr
E
=⋅+⋅⋅−=ρ+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+=
2
1
2
* 1(3c)  
                                                          
4 Calvo and Reinhart (2000) define fear of floating as emerging economies reluctance to allow exchange rate free floating. This extreme 
presses central banks to intervene in foreign exchange markets actively.  
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And if we try to isolate the monetary base (H), expression 3c turns into 3d. 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ρ+−+⋅−=
E
EEr
mm
l
Y
mm
l
H
E
*21 0;0 <∂
∂<∂
∂
E
M
E
H S(3d)  ,      
Equation 3d shows clearly monetary policy subordination to the maintenance of certain 
parity. It means exchange rate and money supply will evolve in opposite directions. If there is 
a depreciation tendency, central bank will be forced to intervene in foreign exchange markets, 
selling foreign currency in exchange for domestic currency. This action will reduce 
international reserves endowment as well as monetary base and money supply. On the 
contrary, pressures for appreciating domestic currency will force central bank to buy foreign 
currencies, which will help to widen monetary base. 
 
Figure 2. National money and foreign exchange market: FE curve if central bank does 
not intervene 
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Note: Out of convenience, the graph where foreign exchange market is drawing has been 
rotated 90° anti clockwise, in a way that interest rates is rising when they are moving to left 
side in x-axis meanwhile in y-axis exchange rate increase as further up in the axis. 
Analogously, the graph which illustrates national money market has been rotated 270° 
clockwise, thus real money holdings are gauged from coordinate origin downward on the 
vertical axis, whereas interest rates are measured from coordinate origin towards right side 
on the x-axis. 
Source: Author’s own diagram. 
 
Putting all these components together, we can build the FE1 curve illustrated in figure 2. It 
plots the functioning of domestic and foreign financial markets. In this way, the FE1 curve is a 
function formed by the combinations of nominal exchange rates and national output for which 
national money market and foreign exchange market are in equilibrium simultaneously. 
Mathematically, reordering equation 3d and isolating E or Y, we can define the Financial 
Economy (FE) function in terms of equilibrium exchange rate: 
 
( ) ρ−−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅+⋅⋅−+
=
*
2
1
2
11 rY
l
l
Hmm
l
EE
E
0<∂
∂
Y
E(3e) FE Function →  ,     
or the Financial Economy (FE) function in terms of equilibrium output: 
( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ρ+−+⋅+⋅⋅=
E
EEr
l
l
Hmm
l
Y
E
*
1
2
1
1 0
E
Y <∂
∂(3e.1) FE Function →   ,      
FE curve determines an inverse causality between national output and nominal exchange rate, 
plotted in upper right panel in figure 2. 
Nevertheless, the model that we are creating assumes that central bank is committed to 
exchange rate stability. 
Let us suppose, there is rise in output from Y  up to Y1 2 that causes an increase of money 
demand for transaction reasons, which graphically shifts money demand curve L1 towards the 
left side in lower left panel in figure 2. 
If money supply doesn’t change, an excess of demand will occur in national money markets 
raising national interest from i  as far as i1 2. It enhances the rate of return on financial 
investments in domestic currency deposits (from RFINC  up to RFINC 1 2), giving rise to a 
capital inflow that will hasten a local currency appreciation from E  to E1 2, if central bank 
doesn’t intervene in foreign exchange markets. 
But this is not the case. The subordination of monetary policy to the maintenance of certain 
parity5 will force central to intervene in foreign exchange markets to avoid domestic currency 
                                                          
5 It means there is a de facto pegged exchange rate system. 
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appreciation. In this scenario, monetary authority must buy foreign currency, widening 
monetary base and money supply in real terms, in absence of sterilization. 
P
M s1
P
M s2Graphically, it causes a scrolling down of   function as far as  in lower left panel in 
figure 3 and FE
 
A curve towards right side as far as FE  in the top panel. B
Figure 3. National money and foreign exchange markets: FE curve if central bank 
intervenes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own diagram. 
 
In this way, central bank’s performance achieves to compensate exchange rate downward 
tendency as well as national interest and capital inflows rising. Consequently, the exchange 
rate parity will remain constant in E1 in spite of higher output. It means that if there are 
international reserves enough expected exchange rate equals equilibrium exchange rate 
(EE=E1) an then FE function becomes a FE1 curve completely elastic. 
(3e.2) FE1 Function →   ( ) ( )ρ+⋅+⋅⋅= *rllHmmlY 1211  ,   0=∂∂YE  
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3. THE DYNAMICS OF THIRD GENERATION CRISES 
3.1. THE ORIGINS OF FINANCIAL FRAGILITY 
Using the model developed in the previous section, we can collect the logic of financial and 
exchange rate crises explained in the different types of third generation models to describe 
1997 East Asian crisis. 
With this aim, we consider the case of Sintaiko. Sintaiko is an imaginary emerging market 
economy defined as a country with low-to-middle per capita income of East Asian. 
Sintaiko’s exchange rate policy is articulated on the basis of a pegged exchange rate system. 
The election of this kind of regime is explained by policymakers wish to stabilize trade flows 
in a country where the most operations are denominated in foreign currency; but also 
responds to the idea of using the exchange rate as a nominal anchor. This practice reduces the 
central bank’s independence but, at the same time, offers a credible rule for the monetary 
policy formulation that allows escaping from temporarily inconsistent actions. Likewise, the 
central bank fixes currency parity in an E1 value. 
Figure 4 combines the RE and FE functions to determine the macroeconomic short-term 
equilibrium. Sintaiko’s economy will only be in equilibrium when the markets of goods and 
services and the financial markets –both national money and foreign exchange markets– are in 
balance simultaneously. 
In this way, equations (1e.1) and (3e.1) establish that for any level of national output (Y), 
there is a nominal exchange rate value (E) that satisfies the interest rate parity condition –
given real money supply, foreign interest rates (i*), expected exchange rate (Ee), premium risk  
(ρ)  and domestic (P) and foreign price (P*) levels–.  
This situation, graphically, will take place at a point like 1, where the intersection of RE1 and 
FE  curves determine an equilibrium nominal exchange rate E1 1 and a national income Y1. If 
we assume that equilibrium parity (E1) coincides, circumstantially, with exchange rate fixed 
by central bank ( E =E1) and with future expected exchange rate (EE), the initial FE 1A curve is 
transformed into the FE1B curve (a completely horizontal function), because depreciation 
expectations will be void (d=0). 
Point 1 describes Normal Equilibrium (Krugman, 2000), where equilibrium output equals 
to: ( ) ( ρ+⋅+⋅⋅= *r
l
lHmm
l
Y
1
2
1
1
1 ) and equilibrium exchange rate matches up with exchange rate 
fixed by central bank ( E =E1) as well as with the future expected exchange rate (EE ). In 
addition, we are assuming fixed price levels at home and abroad in the short-term and no 
foreign debt (D*=0). 
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Figure 4. Sintaiko’s Eonomy Short-Tem Equilibrium 
  
E  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s Own Diagram. 
 
At this scenario, the successful economic development strategy based on export promotion, 
implemented over the previous decades, moves Syntaiko to integrate further in global capital 
markets, taking into account several international financial agencies’ advice. In this way, in a 
favourable momentum, economic authorities decide to remove capital controls and accelerate 
the liberalization of domestic financial markets. 
The removal of financial restrictions that limit capital mobility, in a context of continual 
domestic growth and foreign interest rates abnormally low6, give rise to a huge increase in 
investment inflows. Although part of them takes the form of foreign direct investment (FDI), 
most of these capital inflows are short-term credits in foreign currency. 
This is driven not just the inability of Sintaiko’s companies to obtain mid- long funds in 
narrow-shallow domestic capital markets (original sin), but also because the pegged exchange 
rate system makes exchange rate risk less perceptible. This short-term indebtedness in foreign 
currency is reinforced by implied guarantees over companies’ investments on behalf of 
Sintaiko’s Government –introducing a moral hazard problem– as well as by poor regulated 
financial institutions. 
Then, Sintaiko is involved in an unstoppable dynamics of increasing foreign indebtedness that 
turns the country into an extraordinarily vulnerable economy to a financial panic situation for 
three main reasons. 
                                                          
6 We are assuming there is a liquidity excess in capital markets of advanced economies.  
RE1
Y1
E = E1 FE1 (EE=E1) 
1
 Nominal 
Exchange Rate 
 
Y National Income 
Normal 
Equilibriu
 15
First, in a context of free capital mobility, the lack of well-developed mid-long term capital 
markets confers commercial banks a pre-eminent role as financial intermediaries and accounts 
for “hot money” arising arranged in short-term or very short-term credits, loans and deposits 
that increase the likelihood of sudden stop in these capital inflows, in the face of any 
unexpected event that changes future expectations. 
Second, the faults in domestic capital markets moves domestic companies to finance their 
long-term investments by means of short-term debt in foreign currency because, on the one 
hand, expected benefits on long-term investment offset the possible liquidity problems 
stemming from short-term financing; and, on other hand, the advantages of getting into debt 
abroad at low interest rates prevailing over potential costs of possible domestic currency 
devaluation, even more when the pegged parity is seemingly credible and there is an implicit 
warranty of bailing-out bad investments. 
This tendency to progressive short-term financial leverage in foreign currency, graphically, 
entails a gradual curvature backwards of RE  original curve that transforms it into RE1 2 curve 
in figure 5 and 6. 
This is because the real effects of devaluation can change when financial and non financial 
national companies have too much foreign currency short-termed debt. Maturity mismatches 
as well as currency mismatches7 generate a latent problem in companies' balance-sheets that 
could compromise their solvency if a sudden capital flight or devaluation happens. 
In this way, when domestic companies are very short-term leveraged in foreign currency, their 
financial position will be notably vulnerable, because possible national currency devaluation 
will reduce expected rate of return on investments in domestic currency and will increase the 
value of foreign currency debits in terms of domestic currency. 
This extreme undermines companies’ net asset value, generates liquidity problems and 
diminishes their investment capacity8. This inverse causality between nominal exchange rates 
and national output is called balance-sheet effect –balance-sheet problems in the terminology 
of Krugman’s 1999 and 2000– and explains private investment shortfalls that reduce domestic 
demand and affect economic activity negatively. Again, expression (1e) catches up this 
Balance-sheet effect by means of ( )*2 DEb ⋅⋅ . 
0*2 <⋅=∂
∂ Db
E
YBalance-Sheet Effect:   
                                                          
7 A currency mismatch arises from an asynchrony between currency in which debts are called and currency in which investments are made. 
A maturity mismatch occurs when domestic companies finance long-term investment projects with short-term credits. 
8 When companies are much leveraged, their indebtedness capacity is practically void and, then, financing new investment is diminished to 
self-finance capacity, which is always limited to equity value. 
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But, when economic downturn caused by those financial difficulties is important enough, the 
balance-sheet effect and, by extension, domestic currency devaluation will have recessive 
effects on real economy, leading to RE1 curve in figure 1 bows backwards and changes into 
RE . 2
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]*** DEbYpExDAbr)bc(SY ⋅⋅−⋅⋅⋅+−⋅+⋅+−α= 11122(1e.2) RE
 
Ex
ch
an
ge
 R
at
e 
Pe
rv
er
se
 Z
on
e 
2 Function →  
 
We assume that this singularity applies for nominal exchange rate values ranged between E− 
and E+. This interval determines a perverse zone (PZ) for which the balance-sheet effect 
overcomes the pro-competitive effect. Here any nominal devaluation –given the impact on 
companies’ balance-sheet– loses their role as instrument of macroeconomic adjustment and it 
becomes a clear damage for the economy. Mathematically,  
( ) ( )[ ] 0*2**1 <⋅−⋅=∂∂ DbYpxEY**1*2 YpxDbEEE ⋅>⋅⇒≥≥ −+If     and then,   
Graphically, this relation is represented by the downward-sloping RE2 between E− and E+. 
Figure 5. Goods and services markets operation: Real Economy (RE) curve 
Source: Author’s own diagram based on Krugman (2000) 
 
However, for nominal exchange rate levels lower than E− and higher than E+, the RE2 curve 
keeps its original upward slope. 
E 
Nominal 
Echange Rate 
RE1
REPro-Competitive Effect> Balance Sheet Effect 2
Y 
National Income 
E +
E -
Balance Sheet Effect > Pro-Competitive Effect 
Pro-Competitive Effect> Balance Sheet Effect
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When exchange rate is located below E−, local currency is very solid and the pegged parity 
credible. In this situation, and in spite of companies’ indebtedness, financial vulnerability is 
less because there is not a fair exchange rate risk. Then, the balance-sheet effect is 
unimportant and, therefore, the final effect of devaluation on aggregate demand and on 
economic activity will be positive, because the pro-competitive effect rules over the balance-
sheet effect9. As a result, exchange rate and output will move, again, in the same direction in 
this stretch of RE  curve. Mathematically, this means: 2
( ) ( )[ ] 0*2**1 >⋅−⋅=∂∂ DbYpxEY*2**1 DbYpxEE ⋅>⋅⇒< −When     and then,   
In the same way, for exchange rates above E+, domestic currency is much devaluated. Then, 
the impact of any devaluation on the companies’ economic and financial structure will be 
limited because the most of indebted companies will have already failed. Then the balance-
sheet effect will be slightly significant and it will hardly be able to make up for the pro-
competitive effect. In this extreme situation, any devaluation fosters a certain expansion of 
national output and the RE  curve presents a positive slope again. Mathematically, this means: 2
( ) ( )[ ] 0*2**1 >⋅−⋅=∂∂ DbYpxEY*2**1 DbYpxEE ⋅>⋅⇒> +When     and then,   
When the exchange rate perverse zone appears in foreign exchange markets, the short-term 
structure of outstanding debt in foreign currency, both public and private and perverse zone 
impose the need for a stable exchange rate as informal coverage10 mechanism, so any 
devaluation raises opportunity cost to leave the parity and reinforces, paradoxically, central 
bank’s commitment with E  parity. 1
Third, the indirect result of these capital inflows is the great upsurge of international reserves 
endowment and, by extension, of economy’s money supply. Although the central bank of 
Sintaiko tries to sterilize this reserves increase, its efforts to neutralize money expansion fail 
because we are assuming financial assets are imperfect substitutes. The higher money in 
circulation makes it easy for deposits to grow and feed the process of banks’ money creation. 
Initially, the domestic credit increase serves to finance productive investments that stem from 
economic growth. But as time goes by, these capital inflows also trigger speculative 
                                                          
9 Obviously, aggregate demand increases and output growth caused by depreciation will be lower than there would have been without this 
poor balance-sheet effect.  
10 For Mckinnon (2000b) this circumstances help to explain high frequency pegging, that is, control exercised by Asian countries on 
exchange rate movements in very short-term. 
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11investments in the real estate sector and on stock markets, fostering  the appearance of 
financial bubbles. 
 
Figure 6. Effects of Financial Leverage on Dynamics of Third Generation Crisis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s Own Preparation 
At the beginning, all this fragility goes unnoticed in an climate of economic euphoria: 
country’s growth rate is very high, inflation rate is low, unemployment rate is low too, public 
budget is consolidated, trade balance has registered few deficits associated to financing needs 
that economic expansion imposes, and monetary and exchange rate policies have been 
consistent all the time. 
Considering this conjuncture, depreciation expectations are void, whereas premium risk tends 
to be located at minimal levels and everyone, included global financial markets, will 
understand that increasing international capital inflows are fully well-taken and respond to an 
obvious soundness in macroeconomic fundamentals and therefore, rising foreign indebtedness 
will be sustainable in the long term. 
                                                          
11 The only way, through the central bank could avoid excessive money supply increase, would involved to withdraw exchange rate fixed in 
E1, allowing Sintaiko‘s currency appreciation. But this choice has been ruled out because a strongest currency could make country exports 
less competitive in global markets and because, in the Government opinion’s, the pegged exchange rate provided certainty to trade and 
financial operations. 
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It is precisely because of it and in spite of the transformation of RE curve that the whole 
economy keeps on placing in normal equilibrium in figure 6. 
 
3.2. GESTATION AND BURST OF FINANCIAL CRISIS 
3.2.1. THE LOST OF CONFIDENCE AND THE FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 
Let's suppose now that something happens, like a political crisis, an economic downturn in a 
nearby country, a strong depreciation of a foreign currency that reduces national companies’ 
competitiveness, a fall in export prices that reduces terms of trade, rising world interest rates, 
or a fall in country’s productiveness affects the cash-flow of some Sintaiko’s companies 
negatively and causes certain liquidity problems that hinder credit and debt payments. 
Under these conditions, uncertainty will increase and, then, expectations about economy’s 
performance in the next future could become more pessimistic, especially when these 
difficulties cause the bankruptcy in some companies. Then, credit mechanism that had 
favoured irrational exuberance in financial markets begins to act in the opposite sense, 
precipitating a financial panic. This financial panic bursts the speculative bubbles, affecting to 
the dynamics of capital markets and of real estate market and triggering a sudden reversion of 
capital inflows, when the most of foreign investors and domestic credit institutions choose to 
not roll over short-term investments, credits, loans and deposits, in a frenzied rush to avoid 
losses. 
These massive capital outflows deepen liquidity restriction and force many companies to sell 
off their long-term investments to fulfil their short-term payments. However, the premature 
settlement of those assets will generate insufficient resources to cover outstanding debts, and 
this extreme will validate expectations shifting and will re-feed capital flight. 
These events will speed up the collapse of domestic financial system, spreading quickly to the 
rest of Sintaiko’s economy when investment and private consumption goes down, fostering a 
sharp contraction in domestic demand and output from Y  up to Y1 2. As we can see in figure 7, 
at least there are two possible exchange rate levels satisfying equilibrium in good and services 
markets, depending12 on if domestic currency tends to depreciate up to E   2
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]*** DEbYpExDAbr)bc(SY ⋅⋅−⋅⋅⋅+−⋅+⋅+−α= 21211222  for E = E2
or tends to appreciate up to E0
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]*** DEbYpExDAbr)bc(SY ⋅⋅−⋅⋅⋅+−⋅+⋅+−α= 01011222  for E = E0
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3.2.2. THE LOGIC OF SPECULATIVE ATTACK AGAINST NATIONAL 
CURRENCY 
 
EIn the middle of these turbulences, the pegged value of exchange rate ( = E1) stops being 
credible because the rate of depreciation (d) and premium risk (ρ) are growing. Then, foreign 
exchange markets will place expected exchange rate in EE= E  value above E2 1, causing that 
the FE1B curve will lose its horizontal shape becoming FE2 at the same time that it will scroll 
up in figure 7. Mathematically it means that the original FE :   11 EEE E ==1
 
FE  Function →  , with  EEE 1= 110 EEd E =⇒=  1
 
 when depreciation expectations makes d ≠ 0. is transforming into FE2
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Figure 7. Financial Fragility, Sudden Stop and Speculative Attack 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s Own Preparation. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
12 Of note domestic output falls in both cases. If appreciation happens imports will be higher. If depreciations occurs  the balance-sheet 
effect overcomes the pro-competitive effect. 
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In this scenario, the mere possibility that the Government of Sintaiko bails-out bad 
investments of financial and non financial companies generates a very significant potential 
stock of contingent public debts, which raises serious troubles about the sustainability of 
balanced budget. In fact, potential bail-out destroys temporary consistency of economic 
policy. That is explained because hypothetical upwards public deficit could involve restrictive 
fiscal policies to correct it. 
Then, according to financial agents’ logic, higher public deficit and lower growth rates in the 
near future creates the fear of fiscal deficits monetization. Because of it, foreign exchange 
markets, foreseeing the rising in domestic credit should force foreign reserves to bear the 
adjustment process, will anticipate today a future devaluation. The expected devaluation will 
generate increasing pressures on foreign exchange markets that will force the central bank to 
intervene in defence of E , an overvalued parity now. 1
However, in a financial panic context, the options of economic policy to overcome liquidity 
lack and to support, simultaneously, the pegged exchange system are mutually incompatible 
targets. 
Thus, central bank’s intervention, selling foreign currency and going up interest rates to avoid 
capital flight, shifts investors’ expectations. Paradoxically, the defence of the pegged parity, 
far from restoring financial markets stability, will tend to depress country’s economic activity 
and exacerbate exchange market strains13. 
Furthermore, this dynamics is fostering a favourable situation for the bursting of a speculative 
attack, not just because the progressive decrease of international reserves, but also the balance 
between the cost of supporting current parity (E1) and the cost of losing credibility if the 
pegged exchange rate system was withdrawn rapidly gets worse as time goes by. In fact, 
increasing cost that imposes the defence of  an overvalued parity, in terms of lower growth 
rates and higher unemployment rates, will undermine central bank’s will to intervene on 
exchange markets and, at the same time, will hope the pegged exchange rate will be left 
definitively in the next future. 
At this scenario, very probably, exchange market’s agents will be coordinated to attack 
domestic currency and force its devaluation, hoping for an implied resignation of monetary 
authorities to defend the pegged exchange rate system. And precisely then, the overwhelming 
dynamics of exchange markets, encouraged by the strategy of large players, reinforced by 
                                                          
13 Alternatively, if the central bank had chosen a monetary restrictive policy in an attempt to prevent capital flight and to modify investor 
expectations, its performance would have just aggravated the economy’s liquidity restriction. This circumstance would have reinforced 
investment demobilization, would have validated expectation shifts and would have generated a domestic demand decrease that would have 
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herding and amplified by contagion effect will make hyperdepreciation of domestic currency 
inevitable. 
Likewise, the speculative attack will defeat Sintaiko’s commitment with the parity E1. Quite 
simply, the central bank will stop intervening because there comes a moment where the 
Government prefers to take on the loss of credibility that the parity withdrawal supposes, 
instead of being obliged to assume the costs of maintaining an overvalued exchange rate. And 
then, as soon as monetary authority allows free float, an overshooting of national currency 
exchange rate takes place, from a value E  to a value E1  3, causing that the FE2 becomes FE3 
and scrolls up in figure 7. Mathematically it means 
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3.2.3. BALANCE-SHEET PROBLEMS AND THEIR DEVASTATING EFFECTS  
This hyperdepreciation is another of the factors that, strikingly, helps to highlight the fragility 
of financial and non financial companies, which are excessively short-term leveraged in 
foreign currency. 
Here, devaluation of domestic currency, far from working as a mechanism of macroeconomic 
adjustment, will aggravate the crisis virulence because the pegged exchange rate resignation 
will emphasize a perverse dynamics by reason of financial panic turns good investments into 
bad investments. This is because exchange rate overshooting reduces the expected return on 
investments in national currency but, above all, makes foreign currency liabilities more 
onerous. This extreme undermines the companies’ equity and worsens economy’s liquidity 
restriction even more. 
And then, if the Sintaiko’s Government doesn’t bail-out bad investments, because it doesn’t 
have enough resources to assume the cost of rescue, many financial and non financial 
companies will go bankrupt. Therefore, economy will register a very important private 
investment downturn, not just because destruction of physical capital associated to vanishing 
of many companies or devastation of great part of financial sector but also because the 
surviving companies are so indebted that their investment capacity, limited to devaluated 
equity, is very poor. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
hastened a speculative attack on national currency, given the economic authorities’ resignation to bear the cost associated with a pegged 
exchange rate supporting. 
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The downfall in Sintaiko’s productive weaving makes it difficult to attend a higher export 
demand caused by depreciation. The lack of this traditional pro-competitive effect will confer 
an absolute and devastating relevancy to the balance-sheet effect; devaluation, under these 
conditions, will also result in a drastic decrease of aggregate demand and an abrupt change in 
the current account balance –not so much for export increase but rather for sudden import 
decrease– that will end up by affecting country’s economic activity very negatively. 
This lower output triggers an investment demobilization process on behalf of foreign creditors 
fulfils the most pessimistic expectations, causing a fall in private consumption and an 
unwanted investment in inventories that moves companies to reduce their activity 
furthermore. As a result of this perverse dynamics, national output diminishes suddenly, from 
Y  up to Y2 3, and, Sintaiko’s economy inevitably turns out to be immersed in a 
macroeconomic deep crisis that places the country in crisis equilibrium in figure 7, 
characterized by a private sector in bankruptcy and a hyperdepreciated currency. 
Where Y  crisis equilibrium output equals to 3
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This rapid transition from normal equilibrium towards crisis equilibrium will become a 
source of consternation and an affront for the country. Sintaiko’s economic authorities will 
have the sensation that the economy’s sins did not deserve such severe punishment and will 
think they should have done something to avoid it. Moreover, this crisis episode stigmatizes 
to the national economy because, from then on financial markets will believe that 
devaluations are harmful, and so, for a question of self-fulfilling expectations, devaluations 
end up turning into a terrible offence for the country. 
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4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this paper we have create an eclectic model that systematizes the dynamics of self-fulfilling 
crises, focusing the main aspects of the three typologies of third generation models, to 
describe the stylized facts that hasten the withdrawal of a pegged exchange rate system. 
The main conclusions of our analysis can break down in four aspects. The first one is that 
exchange crises and financial crisis are considered interrelated phenomena. As we have 
shown in our paper, a speculative attack against a national currency and their later devaluation 
is more a symptom than a fundamental aspect in the birth of a much wider crisis. 
According to the logic of our model, the existence of a very significant short-term investment 
in a context of free capital mobility, the companies’ financial vulnerability linked to their 
foreign currency indebtedness as well investors’ psychology could encourage a financial 
panic situation when a real, monetary or political shock, or sometimes nothing at all, 
precipitates a sudden stop of capital in flows. This capital flight imposes a very severe 
liquidity restriction, deepened by national currency hyperdepreciation, which through the 
disappearance of many companies and domestic demand downturn spreads to whole markets 
of goods and services. 
The second aspect that our model highlights is that once the self-fulfilling crisis has burst, the 
options of economic policy are very limited, if any exist, since correcting liquidity restriction 
that generates capital flight and support, simultaneously, the pegged exchange rate system are 
mutually incompatible targets. The weakness of finance, public or private, restricts the use of 
interest rates as instrument to dissuade speculation, while the importance of private debt in 
foreign currency invalidates devaluation as mechanism of macroeconomic adjustment. In fact, 
in this scenario, policymakers’ options are limited to choose the kind of crisis to be 
experienced: a financial crisis or an exchange rate crisis. 
But perhaps the most striking element of our model is that when the balance-sheet effect is a 
clear possibility in emerging economies that undermines and offsets pro-competive effect, the 
exchange rate loses its original stabilizing role becoming a source of very important troubles. 
It explains why devaluations are associated to economic recession and not to export growth, 
aggregate demand increase and output expansion as happens in advanced countries. 
This singularity generates what Calvo and Reinhart (2000a and 2000b) called fear of floating. 
This fear of floating could justify the reserve of emerging economies to allow the free float of 
their currencies and, at the same time, could explain, jointly with the use of exchange rate as a 
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nominal anchor, the rigidity of exchange rate movements on a monthly or quarterly basis 
observed in McKinnon (2000a and 2000b). 
Finally, our fourth contribution is a corollary of previous thing. The Original Sin Hypothesis 
and financial vulnerability that stems from it, introduce two patterns of measurement on 
international capital markets (Krugman, 1999a and Edwards, 2001). Thus, in the most 
developed countries it is possible to harmonize certain freedom of international capital flows, 
certain monetary policy autonomy and certain exchange rate stability at the same time, 
overcoming the tyranny of inconsistent trinity because here domestic currency enables to be 
devaluated in a natural way. Instead, in emerging countries any attempt to use the exchange 
rate as an macroeconomic instrument and to carry out a moderate devaluation causes a drastic 
loss in economy’s confidence that triggers a self-fulfilling crisis because when financial 
markets believe that devaluations are harmful, devaluations end up becoming a huge 
economic problem for any of those countries. 
 
 26
Annex 1. Some Empirical Evidences 
 
ORIGIN AND CAUSES OF EXCHANGE RATE AND FINANCIAL CRISES IN 
EMERGING ECONOMIES DURING SECOND HALF OF 1990’s
 
As we have explained, traditionally, in a context of limited capital mobility, exchange rate 
crises had their origin in continuous current account deficits. But increasing financial 
integration caused by the processes of capital movements’ liberalization and the deregulation 
of domestic financial systems created a new typology of crises: crises called self-fulfilling 
crises by economic literature, which are crises born in the balance of payments’ financial 
account, and where the exchange rate crisis and financial crisis are combined, simultaneously. 
Graph 1. Exchange rate crisis effects in emerging economies 
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Note: Average values for Mexico (1995), South Korea, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Thailand (1998), Brazil (1999) and Argentina (2001).  
Source: Author’s own elaboration using data of Asian Development Bank and IMF 
International Financial Statistics. 
 
In the middle of the 1990s, the economies of Latin America and of Eastern Asia which were 
more integrated into international capital markets were hit by a string of crisis of this nature. 
The Exchange rate and financial crisis in Mexico, at the end of 1994, spread rapidly to 
Argentina. During the third quarter of 1997, the Asian miracle economies were hit by a 
financial crisis, unexpectedly. Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea 
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and, into a lesser extent, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan suffered several banking and 
financial crises that derived into exchange rate crises. At the beginning of 1999, Brazil was 
experiencing a financial crisis after mid-1998 Russian crisis. During the following years, a 
string of banking crises of variable intensity affected several Latin America countries like 
Ecuador, Colombia and Peru. Chile avoided the crisis but its economic growth slowed down 
notably. At the end of 2001, excessive domestic and external indebtedness of Argentina 
economy led to a debt crisis that ended up with Uruguay being contaminated through the 
banking system  
According to Hinarejos and Varela (2003), the most striking fact of these episodes of 
exchange rate and financial crises has been, more than their proximity and frequency in time, 
their magnitude and severity. Exchange rate crises have been more pronounced than in the 
past and this has resulted in important costs for the population of the involved countries. As 
we can see in graph 1, the sudden stop of capital inflows hastened a huge liquidity restriction 
that entailed drastic shortfall of aggregate demand, an abrupt change in current account 
balance from a deficit to a surplus that ended up by harming the economic activity very 
negatively. 
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